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IIPER accepts outside submissions

ANNOUNCEMENT: As a consequence of reduced employment and the need to find additional income, IIPER will be coming out only once per month for the foreseeable future. Any leads on employment opportunities would be most appreciated.

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IIPER is written and edited by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn unless otherwise noted. Research assistance is provided by Yelena Altman, Seth Gray, John Andrew Jones, Leonid Naboyschikov, Anna Nevo, and Daniel Painter.

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RECENT MUSINGS FROM CE QADIS: CE qadi Ali Abu Mukhammad Al-Dagistani (Dagestani)

The CE’s qadis continue to play a leading Theo-ideological and propaganda role in the organization, spearheading its efforts to establish a parallel state authority and dual sovereignty and thus carry out a violent jihadi revolution against Russian ‘infidel’ rule. Recent articulations have come from the qadis of the CE’s Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV) in Russia’s Republic of Dagestan, in particular the CE’s qadi Ali Abu Mukhammad ad-Dagistani (al-Dagestani), a Dagestani of unknown ethnicity and former the DV’s qadi.

The Dagestani’s domination is a consequence of the upheaval in the other main vilaiyats. The CE’s Nokchicho Vilaiyat (NV) in Chechnya remains gutted after the NV split last year, and it remains difficult if not impossible to tell whether jihadi attacks or counter-terrorist operations in Chechnya involve CE NV mujahedins or the independent NV (INV) mujahedins led by amir Hussein Gakaev. The CE’s Galgaiche Vilaiyat (GV) in Ingushetia has been in upheaval since the capture of its amir ‘Magas’ Ali Taziev’ in June of last year and the killing of Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii in March 2011. The United Vilaiyat of Kabardiya, Balkariya, and Karachai (OVKBK) responsible for CE operations in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya (KBR) and the Republic of Karachaev-Cherkessiya (KChR) saw its leadership decimated in April, and its new amir, naib, and qadi remain unidentified. Thus, as we have noted numerous times, the DV is now spearheading or bearing the bulk of the burden of the CE’s jihadi Theo-ideological and operational activity.

CE qadi Ali Abu Mukhammad ad-Dagistani has issued several statements and videos and engaged in an Internet question-and-answer session in July conducted in two parts. On June 28th the DV’s website Guraba.info posted an audiotape of some 45 minutes without a transcript from Dagistani in which he pontificates on the Salafist form of rule, jihad, shakhids, and other issues.1 The audio is accompanied by a still photograph showing the heavily bearded Dagistani sitting cross-legged on the floor or the ground (in the video chirping birds accompany Dagistani along with the occasional laughs and responses of agreement from nearby companions) with a computer on his lap and a Kalashnikov leaning on the wall beside him. Dagistani speaks in Russian with a thick local, likely Avar accent and but most often in Arabic as he references various Islamic texts to support his conclusions. The readings from the Arabic texts are punctuated by summations and explanations of the main point in his somewhat broken Russian.

Dagistani begins with a brief comment on the propriety of taking booty from the infidel, stating that this is a question of what money mujahedhin should or can rely on, and emphasizes that what is taken from the ‘infidel’ is the best trophy or booty a mujahed can win. He then turns to the issue of the amir’s role and the mujahedhin’s and/or Muslims’ relations with him. Citing from the Koran and other sources, he states that the particular ayat demonstrates that Muslims need to be ruled and by someone from among them, that is – an amir, the ruler. Citing hadiths from the Sunna, Dagistani notes that because each Muslim or mujahedhin will have his or her point of view, an amir is needed and everyone was subordinate himself or herself to the amir so that they will be united and proceed from one point of view. If their forefathers could appoint an amir in the conditions of the desert than today’s Muslims can easily do this in their villages or other population centers. Nothing is said about who selects the amir, and CE practice is for a Madzhlisul shura to select the CE amir, and the CE amir appoints the vilaiyats’ amirs, with the latter appointing their fronts’ or sectors’ amirs and so on. Citing the medieval scholar Ibn Tamiya, a favorite among Salafists and jihadists, Dagistani notes that to appoint an amir is one of the strongest obligations for Muslims. Further on he states: “We need authorities. Without authorities we are empty people.” He acknowledges, however, that at present the CE mujaheddin cannot establish a true authority, noting that when people come to them – presumably the qadis – asking them to resolve certain problems or conflicts, they cannot enforce their solutions. Rejecting infidel rule, he notes that Muslims cannot submit to people without an education in Islam or people such as “thieves, mafia and gays,” adding: “How long can we suffer such people. Power can only belong to Allah” and “these people (Russian ‘infidels’) should not be allowed to live on this land.”

Dagistani also notes that each has his own point of view and “we are mountain people with hot blood,” and therefore the Caucasus Muslims need the unity provided by the strong rule of the amir. He rejects taking into account one’s nationality, presumably in the choice of amir, or criticizing fellow Muslims for their ethnicity since this is not a shortcoming because it cannot be changed. Only things that can be changed can be regarded as shortcomings. He therefore implies the need to subordinate national identity and interest of one’s ethnic group to those of the umma and Islam; a persistent theme among jihadists the world over of his predecessors, the first two CE qadis – the late OVKBK amir ‘Seifullah’ Anzor Astemirov and the late DV amir ‘Seifullah Gubdenskii’ Magomedali Vagabov.

2 CE qadi Ali Abu Muhhammad ad-Dagistani’s video at “Kadii IK Ali Abu Mukhlammad o pravlenii, dzikhade, o polozenii shakhidov i mnogom drugom.”
3 “Kadii IK Ali Abu Mukhlammad o pravlenii, dzikhade, o polozenii shakhidov i mnogom drugom.”
It must be said that the first part of Dagistani’s audio presentation here is woefully short of political sophistication, tortuously repetitive, indeed primitive, completely lacking the charisma shown by Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, foe example, who was killed in early March 2010. However, Dagistani comes to life when he abandons the holy texts and instead talks from them about death and jihad. He stresses that everyone will die without exception, except for the mujahedin who die on the path of jihad and therefore will live in paradise unlike the rest who are condemned to “hell” or must wait perhaps thousands of years for “judgement day.” He adds the jihadis’ eternal theme of the trade, deal, or exchange in which the mujahedin engages with Allah when he gives up all his worldly possessions and desires for the opportunity to martyr oneself on the path of jihad to paradise. The martyr is saved from judgement day and the sadness of death; “one has to be a fool to refuse that enjoyment,” he stresses. Allah offers: “Here is your salvation: come to jihad,” Dagistani rejoices.4

In a July fatwa-like posting on the DV’s official website VDagestan.info, Dagistani noted that jihad is not obligatory for Muslim women, offering a detailed explanation.5 For jihad to be an obligation, Dagistani listed seven conditions. In addition, to being male, a person must: be a Muslim, be an adult (byt’ sovershennoletnym), be of healthy mind, be of healthy body, free, and financially capable. He elaborates on these, justifying them by reference to certain hadiths and statements by the Prophet Mohammed, which lay out a logic that women are too physically weak and their presence may encourage the Muslims’ enemy in battle when they see that Muslims need to include women in the battle. However, some of the citations are qualified with phrases like the use of women “should be avoided” and “is not recommended.” Thus, Dagistani concludes that women can be used – though there is no mention of the issue of women’s ‘obligation’ – “if Muslims have no choice and they are forced to resort to this, then such is permitted, even, moreover, it is obligatory, since it is necessary to use all means for victory over non-believers.” It is added that women went on military expeditions with the Prophet Mohammed, and even elderly women did so in order to tend the wounded and perform other auxiliary tasks.6 Returning to the

4 “Kadî ik Alikh rejâ Ingîrîsî, dzhikhade, o polozhenii shakhidov i mnogom drugom.”
question of whether jihad is obligatory for Muslim women, Dagistani notes that scholarly opinion is split on the issue, but the weight of opinion goes against jihad as an obligation for Muslim women. He justifies this by quoting the Prophet Mohammed and noting that in practice as well Mohammed did not include women under general mobilizations.\footnote{“Kakie pravila dzhikhada dlya zhenschchin? Kadii Imarata Kavkaz: ‘Dzhikhad dlya zhenschchin – ne fard ain’,” \textit{VDagestan.info}, 4 July 2011, http://vdagestan.info/?p=2125.}

Also in July, DV qadi Dagistani participated in Internet question-and-answer sessions and two videotapes were posted on most CE websites, as well as a transcript of the first session, which was posted on several CE sites as well.\footnote{“Stenogramma video: Kadii IK Abu Mukhammad – ‘Otvety na voprosy’ – 1 chast’,” \textit{Guraba.info}, 8 July 2011, 00:18, \url{http://guraba.info/2011-02-27-17-59-21/30-video/1117--i-q-q-1.html} and \textit{VDagestan.info}, 8 July 2011, http://vdagestan.info/2011/07/08/%d0%ba%d0%b0%d0%b4%d0%b8%d0%b9-%d0%b8%d0%ba-%d0%b0%d0%b1%d1%83-%d0%be%d1%83%d1%85i%d0%b0%d0%be%d0%b0%d0%b4-%d0%be%d1%82%d0%b2%d0%b5%d1%82%d1%8b-%d0%bd%d0%b0-%d0%b2%d0%be%d0%bf%d1%80%d0%be/.} When asked by a questioner about teachers in Dagestan State University and Dagestan State Pedagogical University who “ridicule Islam and are against the hijab,” he expressed a classic takfirdist position, stating such people are considered to “have left Islam according to the unanimous position of the Salafist community and correspondingly their blood, honor and property are permissible (to punish) regardless of whether they are teachers or not. And Allah willing, we will get our hands on them.”\footnote{“Stenogramma video: Kadii IK Abu Mukhammad – ‘Otvety na voprosy’ – 1 chast’,” \textit{Guraba.info}, 8 July 2011, 00:18, \url{http://guraba.info/2011-02-27-17-59-21/30-video/1117--i-q-q-1.html} and \textit{VDagestan.info}, 8 July 2011, http://vdagestan.info/2011/07/08/%d0%ba%d0%b0%d0%b4%d0%b8%d0%b9-%d0%b8%d0%ba-%d0%b0%d0%b1%d1%83-%d0%be%d1%83%d1%85i%d0%b0%d0%be%d0%b0%d0%b4-%d0%be%d1%82%d0%b2%d0%b5%d1%82%d1%8b-%d0%bd%d0%b0-%d0%b2%d0%be%d0%bf%d1%80%d0%be/.}

Asked about strategy and whether the CE was planning a “1999 scenario” or would “wait until the American withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, and the Taliban begins to help,” Dagistani said: “We are fulfilling our obligation before our Ruler, and we are not waiting for the Taliban to help us. We are doing everything possible to build the Caliphate and prepare the ground for this to the best of our capabilities.” Dagistani told the same questioner that the CE would try to make a statement in mosques demanding that Muslim women cover themselves, as the questioner requested. \textbf{Asked}
whether “for example, the amir of the mujahedin of Al Qa’ida in Iraq, the Caucasus Emirate’s amir, the Taliban’s amir, Tahrir-i-Taliban Pakistani, the amir of the Ash-Shabaab mujahedin” or any other amir is the global jihad’s supreme amir, an “amir al-muminin”, or whether the umma would need to wait for the Caliphate’s restoration for the amir al-muminin, Dagistani said that “at the present time there does not exist an Amir al-muminin who possesses those conditions and qualities which the Amir al-muminin should possess as it is said in books such as the “Al Akhkhamu as-sultaniya al-Mavardi” and others, and as regards the front amirs, then not one of them is the Amir al-muminin.”

Dagistani was asked if local amirs should ensure the welfare of his subordinates through the creation of assistance or credit endowments or institutions (baitul mal) and the sharing of al-fai (booty obtained from the enemy without formal war). He answered that they should to the extent they could and promised some communication on this theme in the future. Another questioner said he wanted to join the jihad but was having trouble. Dagistani responded: “He he searches will find. All the Most High will help you, if your intentions are sincere, but be careful and ask Allah sincerely. Even if you die having failed in joining us, then you will receive the degree of martyr in paradise, as the Prophet reported to us, bless and welcome him Allah, in the reliable hadith which Muslim relates.” Asked if it is permissible to kill an atheist without the permission of your amir, the qadi answered that if you are under bayat (loyalty oath) to an amir, then the amir’s permission is needed because the amir “knows best what needs to be done.” If one is not under bayat to an amir, then you can and this is a “good deed, as the Most High said.” Asked if it is permissible to participate in the sport of wrestling, Dagistani answered that any sporting activity “which is to the benefit of the jihad is considered allowed,” citing one as-Shafii, perhaps the founder of the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence. He stipulates that the activity must be engaged in “only within the framework of Shariah law,” however. The second part of

10 “Stenogramma video: Kadii IK Abu Mukhammad – ‘Otvetny na voprosy’ – 1 chast.’,” Guraba.info, 8 July 2011, 00:18, http://guraba.info/2011-02-27-17-59-21/30-video/1117--i-q-q-1-.html and VDagestan.info, 8 July 2011, http://vdagestan.info/2011/07/08/%d0%ba%d0%b0%d0%b4%d0%b8%d0%b9-%d0%b8%d0%ba-%d0%b0%d1%83-%d0%bc%d1%83%d1%85%d0%b0%d0%be%d0%b4-%d0%be%d1%82%d0%b2%d0%b5%d1%8b-%d0%bc%d0%b0-%d0%be%d0%b4-%d0%be/
11 “Stenogramma video: Kadii IK Abu Mukhammad – ‘Otvetny na voprosy’ – 1 chast.’,” Guraba.info, 8 July 2011, 00:18, http://guraba.info/2011-02-27-17-59-21/30-video/1117--i-q-q-1-.html and VDagestan.info, 8 July 2011, http://vdagestan.info/2011/07/08/%d0%ba%d0%b0%d0%b4%d0%b8%d0%b9-%d0%b8%d0%ba%d0%b0%d0%b1%83-%d0%bc%d1%83%d1%85%d0%b0%d0%be%d0%b4-%d0%be
Dagistani’s Q&A was posted in video form without a transcript on Guraba.info on July 10th.12

CE-AFFILIATED WEBSITE’S STATISTICS ON NUMBER OF JIHADI OPERATIONS AND CASUALTIES FROM JANUARY THROUGH MAY 2011

The Caucasus Emirate-affiliated website UmmaNews.com continues to issue monthly reports on the number of attacks carried out by the CE mujahedin and the casualties that have resulted from those attacks (and presumably Russian counter-terrorism operations) among both Russian state agents and on the side of the mujahedin as well. The CE’s reporting appears to be accurate. Taking into account the CE’s data for May,13 the CE mujahedin have claimed responsibility for 307 attacks (305 in the North Caucasus and 2 in Moscow) in the first five months of 2011 (see Table). The two

Table 1. CE Data on Number of Attacks and Casualties in the First Five Months of 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vilaiyat of the Caucasus Emirate</th>
<th>Attacks/Incidents</th>
<th>“Infidels”/”Apostates” Killed</th>
<th>“Infidels”/”Apostates” Wounded</th>
<th>Mujahedin Killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nokchicho (Chechnya)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galgaiche Vilaiyat or NV</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GV (Ingushetia)</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagestan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Vilaiyat or DV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Dagestan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVKBK*</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nogai Steppe</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vilaiyat**</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow***</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL**  307  205  440

*OVKBK* – the United Vilaiyat of Kabardiya, Balkariya and Karachai, the CE’s jihadi network the North Caucasus republics of Kabardino-Balkariya and Karachaev-Cherkessiya.

** Nogai Steppe Vilaiyat covers the North Caucasus regions of Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai for the CE.

*** The two Moscow attacks and the attendant casualties are from the 24 January 2011 suicide bombing at Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport that killed 39 and wounded 180 and the bombing near the FSB Academy in Moscow that produced no casualties. These are not included in the mujahedin’s numbers on casualties in the North Caucasus.

**** The CE’s data do not distinguish between civilian and non-civilian casualties but rather between infidel (*kufr*) and apostate (*murtad*) casualties. Therefore, in cases where we know the victim was a civilian we counted that casualty as a civilian killed or wounded.

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Moscow attacks and the attendant casualties come from the 24 January 2011 suicide bombing at Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport that killed 39 and wounded 180 and the bombing near the FSB Academy in Moscow that produced no casualties. These are not included in the mujahedin’s numbers on casualties in the North Caucasus but were claimed by the CE’s Riyadh Salikhii Martyrs’ Brigade. The data does include the three suicide bombings carried out in the North Caucasus, including the two 14 February 2011 coordinated suicide bombings carried out in Gubden, Dagestan by the ethnic Russian couple of Vitallii Razdobudko and Maria Khorosheva. Also, since the reports continue to divide fatalities and wounded into the categories of kafiry (infidels) and murtady or marinoneti (apostates or puppets), we are unable to delineate between casualties among state agents and those among civilians from the jihadi sources. Therefore, we are including the total number of fatalities and wounded.

The share of attacks that have occurred in Dagestan continues to rise, as it has for more than a year. Now more than 60% of the attacks and casualties
inflicted in Russia have occurred in Dagestan. In May, according to the CE mujahedin’s data, the CE’s Dagestani mujahedin, the Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV), carried out nearly two-thirds of CE operations: 48 of 76.14 The titular Vainakh republics continue to show a very low level of activity, nearly dormant jihad, with NV Chechen and GV Ingush mujahedin producing just 52 attacks in through May. Ingushetiya’s GV has been behind Chechnya’s INV mujahedin for several months. The OVKBK continues rebounded from its 3 attacks in March, with its 11 in April and now 12 in May, and thus it remains the second most active jihadi front for the CE. In sum, the CE’s own data shows that its jihad is largely now a DV or Dagestani affair.

Official Russian sources have been releasing some figures for the same period. For example, the Dagestan Republic’s FSB first deputy chief Sergei Kolomeitsev reported that there were 96 “crimes of a terrorist orientation” just in Dagestan alone during the first five months of 2011.15 It is unclear what exactly what might be included under the definition of category “crimes of a terrorist orientation,” but in recent years that category’s numbers usually exceeded my own and other counts of jihadi terrorist attacks and other forms of jihadi-related violent incidents such as counter-terrorism operations. Thus, this appears to be an underestimation of the number of attacks in Dagestan during the first five months of this year. Kolomeitsev also reported that Russian law enforcement and security forces killed 87 mujahedin or “participants in illegally armed formations” and prevented 24 terrorist attacks just in Dagestan alone during the first five months of 2011.16 The Dagestan FSB’s number of 87 mujahedin killed in the republic during the first five months of the year is considerably higher than the mujahedin’s count of 58 killed mujahedin during the same period.

Russian MVD chief Ruslan Nurgaliev reported figures for the same period, according to which, there were 11 jihadi attacks among 27 “crimes of a terrorist orientation” in the republic during the first five months of this year. The former is much lower than, but the latter figure approximates the mujahedin’s figure of 24 attacks for the same period in Ingushetiya. Nurgaliev

also reported that 24 mujahedin were killed in the republic during the same period compared with the mujahedin’s figure of 13. 17 Russian Investigations Committee Chairman Aleksandr Bastrykin reported data very similar to that issued by the CE mujahedin: more than 300 “attacks and combat operations” in the North Caucasus during the first five months of 2011, marking a 35% increase in attacks this year over last year. 18 If the mujahedin’s data is accurate, the total number of 307 attacks in the first five months of this year puts the CE ahead of last year’s pace in which, according to my own count, there were 583 attacks for the year, marking the third consecutive yearly increase in the number of attacks, according to my own count. Thus, the CE appears poised to achieve a fourth consecutive yearly increase in the number of attacks and perhaps reach the level of 700 attacks for 2011.

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SIXTH SUICIDE BOMBING OF YEAR INTERDICTED IN
INGUSHETIYA?

Russia’s potentially sixth suicide attack of the year occurred on July 12th in Galashki, Ingushetiya. The attack was apparently spontaneous as a result of interdiction and therefore inflicted no casualties; the suicide bomber has not yet been identified. He was stopped by police who asked for his identification papers or passport whereupon he detonated a grenade he was carrying in his bag. 19 These circumstances do not meet the criteria of a planned suicide attack, and therefore will not be counted in our data on jihad-related terrorism statistics as other than a routine attack.

There were five successful suicide bombings in the North Caucasus during the first six months of 2011. Four of them have occurred in the North Caucasus: three in Dagestan and one in Ingushetiya. This year’s first suicide bombing occurred in Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport. There was 1 suicide bombing in Russia in 2008, 16 in 2009, and 14 in 2010.

This year’s suicide attacks have inflicted 252 casualties: three state agents (police, intelligence, and military personnel and civilian officials) have been killed and 28 have been wounded. Among civilians, there have been 37

killed and 184 wounded. Five of this year’s suicide bombers have been male, including this last unsuccessful bomber in Galashki. One has been female, who was an ethnic Russian convert to Islam, as was one of the male suicide bombers, who was her husband, Vitali Razdobudko. The couple carried out their attacks in two separate locations in Gubden, Dagestan on February 14th.

All of this year’s suicide bombings were organized, it appears, by the CE’s Riyadus-Salikiin Martyrs’ Brigade (RSMB) or the CE Dagestan Vilaiyat’s Riyadus-Salikiin Jamaat (RSJ). However, the March attack in Ingushetiya has so far not been claimed by either group, but the RSMB’s amir ‘Khamzat’ is a former amir in the CE’s Ingushetiya branch, the Galgaiche Vilaiyat (GV), suggesting the RSMB was behind that attack.

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SUICIDE BOMBER AITPEROV’S FINAL TESTAMENT VIDEO POSTED

In early July several CE-affiliated websites posted the last testament video of a suicide bomber named ‘Abu Sumaii’, born Abakar Aitperov in 1979, who detonated his IED in his automobile in Makhachkala on 10 May 2011 when police stopped him and asked him for his papers. Aitperov had apparently detonated the bomb he was trying to bring into a military hospital in Dagestan’s capitol Makhachkala where Russia’s MVD chief Ruslan Nurgaliyev was visiting with police and soldiers wounded in a recent battle with mujahedin in Kizlyar, Dagestan.20

In the video, Aitperov is introduced briefly by another masked mujahed who mentions that Abu Sumaii is a mujahed sent by Khamzat, the amir of the CE’s Riyadus Salikiin Martyrs’ Brigade (RSMB) of suicide bombers and is about to set out on his ‘istishkhad’ or self-sacrifice (suicide) operation. Abu Sumaii describes the glories and purpose of such operations, “according to scholars,” noting that their effectiveness lies in the fear they strike in the heart of the kufr (infidel). As he concludes, Aitperov notes: “Allah willing, we have many brothers and sisters who stand in line and want to do the praise in Allah’s name.” The video is 5 minutes and 52 seconds in duration and is dated 10 May 2011, the day of his suicide attack in Makhachkala.21

21 “Poslednee obrashchenie mudhzhakhkida Vilaiyata Dagestan Abu Sumaii pered operatsiei Istishkhada, Dzhumada as-sanii 1432 g.kh./Mai 2011 g.m.,” Guraba.info, accessed on 6 and 15 July 2011.
Aitperov’s attack killed one policeman and wounded another and several a passers-by.\textsuperscript{22} This marked the third suicide bombing in Dagestan so far this year. The first such attack was carried out at Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport in January and was followed by three in a row in Dagestan. Dagestan led in the number (6 of 14) of suicide attacks and overall number of attacks last year as well. Two Dagestani women carried out the dual suicide bombing on Moscow’s metro in March 2010, meaning that Dagestan accounted for 8 of the 14 last year and has accounted for 11 of the last 18 attacks.

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\textbf{ALLEGED RUSSIAN JIHADI SUICIDE BOMBER VIKTOR DVORAKOVSKII CAPTURED}

Viktor Dvorakovskii, who has been wanted since March by Russian security for several months in connection with his possible plans to organize or personally carry out suicide bombings as reported several times by IIPER, was wounded and captured by police on July 14\textsuperscript{th} in Stavropol Krai’s village of Inozemtsevo. When asked to stop and present his identification papers by police he threw an IED, which wounded two policemen. In attempting to throw a second IED, it detonated requiring amputation of one of his arms.\textsuperscript{23}

Dvorakovskii was originally thought to be the May 10\textsuperscript{th} Makhachkala suicide bomber whose last testament video is discussed above. However, on May 11\textsuperscript{th} it was determined that the May 10\textsuperscript{th} suicide bomber was not Dvorakovskii but rather a Dagestani and Makhachkala resident Abakar Aitperov.\textsuperscript{24} Days before Aitperov’s attack, the Russian National Antiterrorism Committee (NAK), the FSB, and Stavropol’s MVD put out a warnings that Dvorakovskii and three other apparently would-be suicide ‘shakhids’ – 33-year old Eldar Bitaev, 20-year old resident of Armavir (Krasnodar) Ibragim Yakhyaevich Torshkhoev, and 27-year old Sochi (Krasnodar) resident Aleksandr Dudkin – were preparing to carry out attacks. The NAK and FSB announced a search for Torshkhoev (whose name suggests he is an ethnic Ingush) on May 3\textsuperscript{rd} claiming he might be in Chechnya. On May 9\textsuperscript{th} Torshkhoev, Dvorakovskii, and the other two were being hunted by

Stavropol’s MVD; the former two were said to have left from Sochi to Stavropol recently in order to carry out suicide attacks.²⁵

As reported in a previous IIPER, Dudkin and Dvorakovskii are ethnic Russians. Dvorakovskii was a friend of the ethnic Russian pair involved in the failed New Year’s Eve suicide bombing plans, Vitalii Razdobudko and Maria Khorosheva, who then detonated suicide belts in two separate locations in Gubden, Dagestan on February 14th. They both studied in Stavropol before becoming jihadists and detonating themselves in Dagestan. He was being searched for ever a bomb accidentally detonated in his apartment in Stavropol. All this points up three recent trends: increased activity in and around Sochi, Krasnodar and Stavropol; the Dagestan-east Stavropol connection; and the conversion to Islam of ethnic Russians and their deployment as suicide bombers. These could have implications for the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games, as the CE may be trying to build up a cadre of ethnic Russian or Slavic attackers who could be more easily infiltrated into Sochi and deployed to attack the Games.

Dvorakovskii’s capture could yield important intelligence on the CE and specifically its Riyadus Salikhiin Martyrs’ Brigade.

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BASHKORTOSTAN AUTHORITIES RAID HIZB UT-Tahrir CELLS
(by John Andrews Jones and Gordon M. Hahn)

On June 3rd, in the Bashkortostan towns of Salavat and Birsk, local security forces raided homes of suspected Hizb ut-Tahrir Islami (HTI) members. Security forces found large amounts of cash and various kinds of propaganda material including magazines, leaflets and videos. Authorities discovered that the Salavat cell was being led by M. Ismabilov and that the cell in Birsk was organized by HTI members from the neighboring town of Dyurtyuli.²⁶ IIPER readers will recall last year’s three apparently jihadi-related incidents in Bashkortostan (and one in Tatarstan) and the appeal by a group calling themselves the Idel-Ural Vilaiyat, declaring their loyalty to the CE, and requesting CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov for assistance in

setting up training camps in the southern Ural mountains and planning terrorist attacks.

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ABOUT IIPER

Islam, Islamism and politics in Eurasia report (IIPER) is a project of the Monterey Terrorism and Research and Education Program (MonTREP) at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, California. It focuses on all politically-relevant issues involving or bearing on Islam and ethnic Muslim communities in Russia and Eurasia writ large. All issues of IIPER can be found at http://www.miis.edu/academics/faculty/ghahn/report.

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IIPER welcomes submissions of 1,500-6,000 words on any aspect of Islamic politics in Eurasia and financial contributions to support the project. For related inquiries or to request to be included on IIPER’s mailing list, please contact gordon.hahn@miis.edu or gordon-hahn@sbcglobal.net.

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