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* IIPER is written and edited by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn unless otherwise noted. Research assistance is provided by Leonid Naboyshchikov, Daniel Painter, and Seth Gray.

SUICIDE BOMBING COUPLE’S ISTISHKHAD TESTAMENT VIDEO
The ethnic Russian jihadi couple of Vitalii Razdobid’ko and Maria Khorosheva, who detonated themselves in the twin suicide bombings in Dagestan last month and were involved in the failed 2010 New Year’s Eve dual suicide bombing plot targeting Red and/or Manezh Squares (see IIPER, Nos. 34 and 35), videotaped an istishkhad or martyrdom final testament which has been posted on the CE’s main website Kavkaz tsentr. Razdobud’ko is seen sitting behind the wheel of a car, presumably the one he detonated in Gubden, and gives a long religious lecture about Islam, the obligation of jihad, the need to raise Allah’s word above all others and establish Shariah law on earth. He discusses several Surras from the Koran and the importance of strict monotheism or tawhid (‘edinobozhie”). Khorosheva’s testament follows. She is seen sitting with her head covered and apparently reading a text covering various Islamist/jihadist themes. The videotape is dated 14 February 2011 and titled in the video icon as ‘Russian Martyrs, Allah Willing: Vitalii Razdobud’ko and Maria Khorsheva: A Declaration.”

THE OVKBK’S SOCHI VECTOR
In Kabardino-Balkaria, on February 18th, a group of OVKBK mujahedin killed three and wounded two tourists from Moscow traveling in a van in Zayukovo to the Mt. Elbrus Ski Resort in Elbrus District. The OVKBK appeared to claim responsibility and reported on the operation before news agencies did. In the report the OVKBK mujahedin reiterated a warning made numerous times that traveling to the theatre of “military operations as tourists and hunters, who the occupiers’ special services send to gather intelligence is

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forbidden and will be prevented by all means.” A mujahdin base was found near Zayukovo on 18 December 2010. Another or the same OVKBK group also blew up a ski lift cable car support pole at the Elbrus resort a few hours later bringing 30 of 45 cabins to the ground but producing no injuries. Mujahed in also attempted to attack a hotel with a vehicle-borne IED in the resort hours later near Terskolk. They left a mined vehicle near the hotel, but the bomb was discovered and disarmed. These efforts and the shooting of a local policeman’s home in Lashkuta, some 15 kilometers south of Zayukovo, were claimed in an OVKBK statement published on Islamdin.com on February 20th.4

The attacks in Elbrus have two benefits from the mujahedin’s point of view. The first benefit is that such attacks could help foil the prospects of major investment being made by Moscow in the Caucasus, in particular in the tourist industry in the KBR and other North Caucasus republics. The plan is to create a cluster of tourism spots across the North Caucasus, one of the crown jewels of which would be the KBR State Preserve, in particular the Mt. Elbrus resort. The goal is to reduce unemployment, especially among young men, in order to drain the pond from which the CE jihadists recruit. Five ski resorts are scheduled to be built in five of the North Caucasus republics by 2020 at a cost of just over 451 billion rubles (approximately $15 billion). Credit Suisse and the UAR’s Invest AD have already declared their readiness to invest in the project. Included among these plans is the KBR’s 2008 plan for five major investment projects that would be able to entertain 25,000 visitors at any one time and provide 20,000 jobs. In 2009 the South Korean company Hanok and Russia’s Olimp agreed to invest 600 million euros in Elbrus to build 300 kilometers of trails with man-made snow and 8 lifts totaling 100 kilometers, as well as a skating rink, hotel, and sports complexes.5 Future investments and the overall plan are put at risk as long as the region remains plagued by jihadi violence and the resulting counter-terrorism operations.

The OVKBK basically acknowledged they were battling to prevent the

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success of these development projects. In an *Islamdin.com* article, the OVKBK noted: “Of course, if you look at these plans of the infidel through the eyes of the uneducated to whom such concepts such as Islam, Faith, Obligation to God, Honor, Dignity, Freedom and Solidarity with the Islamic umma are alien, then these plans look wonderful. … If this strategy is implemented, then, the North Caucasus will become a leading center of health resorts and ski tourism (perversion) of Russia and CIS countries, a major supplier of ecologically clean drinking products, a transport hub and an attractive region for living, the authors promise. There you are!” The author turns then to what is “most dangerous from these projects.” They will increase the number of “perversion establishments” corrupting the morals of Muslims and bringing some of them into the service industry, and “already succeeding generations will be far from Islam and Jihad, please protect us from this All Mighty Allah.” In addition, “a large part of the profits and taxes from these projects will go to the struggle against Islam and Muslims. This is the real goal of these capital investments.” Therefore, “the fact that the mujahedin of our Vilaiyat have begun to shoot infidel tourists is fully justified from the point of view of the Shariat,” he notes, basing this on three points. “First, the Caucasus Emirate is in a full state of war with “infidel Russia,” and the citizens of Russia are our enemies. Second, the incomes from tourism on our lands will go directly into the pockets of our enemies. Third, the appearance on our lands of hundreds of thousands of dirty infidels annually will negatively influence the moral state of our peoples.” Therefore, the mujahedin must step up the tempo of attacks on tourists and the undermining of the tourist industry, he concludes.6

A second benefit by both moving major operations westward to the KBR and targeting a winter resort, they send a message about a potential target that is further westward and also a winter resort zone - the 2014 Sochi Olympics. The mere threat of attacks at the Games could limit investments in, and thus the success of the Games. In addition, the attacks in Elbrus provide excellent training for attacks on the kinds of targets jihadists will encounter in Sochi. The vigorous terrorist activity of the CE’s OVKBK node, which is responsible for carrying out attacks in the KBR as well as in Karachai-Cherkessia Republic (KChR), has long appeared to be part of the CE’s plans to establish a vector in the direction of the Sochi Olympics, as I noted in IIPER, No. 16, 7 June 2010. According to the OVKBK website *Islamdin.com*, Zoyukovo comes under the OVKBK’s Northeast Sector, whose amir is unknown at this point. Elbrus and Terskol, where the car bombing attempt

took place, probably come under the OVKBK’s Southwest Sector. Its amir is the increasingly prominent ‘Zakariya’ Ratmir Shameyev. He has been the most visible of all OVKBK amirs in terms of videos posted on the OVKBK’s website Islamdin.com, with the possible exception of the OVKBK amir himself ‘Abdullah’ Asker Dzhappuev. Shameyev is always dressed fully in black, his head is covered in a black Arab-looking head covering and he sports a black eye patch over his right eye. His most recent claim to infamy is the December 29th ‘liquidation’ of the popular Kabardin ethnographer and beekeeper Aslan Tsipinov for encouraging ‘pagan’ idolatry of national customs. Shameyev claimed responsibility for the attack in an early 2011 video still available on Islamdin.com’s front page.

In response to these events a counter-terrorism operation with an especially strict regime was declared across an area of some 2,000 square kilometers, including all of Elbrus District and part of Baksan District, another area of high jihadi activity in the past year. Roads were closed from 9pm to 6am. The mujahedin had taken a step toward their goal, as the resort area was largely shut down. Nevertheless, on February 22nd a fire fight between mujahedin and security services left six servicemen wounded and one spetsnaz killed and, given varying reports, three to five mujahedin were left dead.

The OVKBK’s Central Sector was very active at the same time as the abovementioned attacks were occurring. The OVKBK claimed and apparently carried out two more attacks that occurred on February 19th, including an attack on traffic police in the KBR capitol, Nalchik, that killed one police inspector, Timur Dolov and the killing of the head of the administration of a village in Khasan, Ramazan Friev. In addition, the OVKBK command claimed responsibility for the February 22nd attack on a MVD spetsnaz group. In the ensuing battle, in which the security services used aviation, the mujahedin claim to have wounded 3–5 spetsnaz near the village of Bylym near the Baksan-Chegem highway. The OVKBK also claimed responsibility for the attack on February 23, as the counter-terrorism operation continued, carried out by its Northeast Sector that heavily wounded police Senior Lieutenant Aslan Afashev as he returned home for the evening. The OVKBK also claimed responsibility on behalf of its Central Sector mujahedin for a major attack in Nalchik on several targets simultaneously in an operation reminiscent of the 13 October 2005 attack by some 200 mujahedin on Nalchik. In this latest

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attack on February 25th the OVKBK mujahedin attacked the FSB building with
grenade launchers, the FSB’s sanitorium ‘Leningrad’, and four traffic police
posts.9 These attacks may have wounded as many as 11-13 people, including
one traffic policeman.10 Another attack on a gas station on February 26th was
not claimed by the OVKBK in its report on its attacks for the month of
February. Nevertheless another counter-terrorism operation was declared for
several areas in Chegem and Chereksk Districts.11

The OVKBK’s level of operational activity in February was
unprecedented for a winter month in the KBR and marks a real surge in its
operational intensity and capacity. The OVKBK’s report on the attacks its
various sectors carried out includes 17 attacks, if one counts the several attacks
carried out on February 25th as six separate attacks as they appear to have
been.12 This rivals the OVKBK’s number of attacks and engagements with
security forces for the entire year both in 2008 and 2009. As reported
previously, 2010 was a breakout year for the OVKBK, but even during that
year the OVKBK mujahedin did not come close to such a number of attacks in
a winter month and rarely attained such a level of operational activity even in
spring or summer month.

Finally, in this surge and other recent operations the OVKBK
mujahedin have demonstrated an impressive degree of tactical and strategic
ingenuity, adaptability, and flexibility. The abovementioned operations were
undertaken in the wake of another series of unique, if less successful
operations in late January and early February in which OVKBK mujahedin
placed bombs near banners declaring such things as the following: “The United
Vilaiyat of Kabardia, Balkaria, and Karachi: The Central Sector” and “The
United Vilaiyat of Kabardia, Balkaria, and Karachi: The Southeastern

9 “O poslednykh sobytiyah v Vilaiyate KBK,” Isladim.com, 20 February 2011,
Ob”edinennogo Vilaiyata KBK,” Isladim.com, 1 March 2011, 12:45,
www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/03/01/79644.shtml.
10 “Kavkaz za nedelyu” obzor glavnykh sobytiy s 21 po 27 fevrale,” Kavkaz uzel, 28
11 “Kavkaz za nedelyu” obzor glavnykh sobytiy s 21 po 27 fevrale,” Kavkaz uzel, 28
February 2011, 09:00, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/181647/ and “Press-reliz
komandovaniya mudzhakhidov Ob”edinennogo Vilaiyata KBK,” Isladim.com, 1
12 “Press-reliz komandovaniya mudzhakhidov Ob”edinennogo Vilaiyata KBK,”
Isladim.com, 1 March 2011, 12:45,
www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2011/03/01/79644.shtml.
This tactic, however, produced only one casualty – a wounded police officer.

In sum, under the leadership of its amir ‘Abdullah’ Asker Dzhappuev the OVKBK has transformed the KBR the second leading front in the CE’s jihad against all the odds. The republic’s population is small and its Islamic roots more shallow than those in Dagestan, Chechnya, and even Ingushetia. Moreover, the OVKBK’s operational effectiveness is high. It also is carrying out politics by other means in a sophisticated way by targeting Moscow’s efforts to resolve employment and development problems in the region; problems that increase the size of the jihadi recruiting pool. The OVKBK is also showing a high level of tactical and strategic ingenuity, adaptability, and flexibility. Finally, the OVKBK may even be poised to rise to the international level, if it is indeed preparing to carry out attacks on the Sochi Olympics.

**JIHADI OPERATIONS IN DAGESTAN IN EARLY 2011**

As we reported in IIPER, No. 35, in mid-January ‘Khasan’ Adam Guseinov, the naib of Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV) amir ‘Khasan’ Israpil Velidzhanov, was killed, and in mid-February two separate suicide bombings were carried out in Gubden, Dagestan by the husband and wife team of Vitalii Razobud’ko and Maria Khorosheva, who were involved in the would-be perpetrators of the planned New Year’s Even twin suicide bombings on Moscow’s Red Square. From mid-January as well the DV’s Khasavyurt Jamaat and Sector as well as the Kizlyar Jamaat were rather busy and suffered a series of blows in the form of the killing of some of its amirs. The DV also has been actively pursuing its policy of administering Shariah law by attacking establishments which sell alcohol or house gambling or prostitution among other strategies and tactics. Below we review just a few of the jihadi attacks and related violent incidents (counter-terrorist operations) of January and February in Dagestan.

In early January the Khasavyurt Jamaat issued another warning to those involved in such activities while claiming responsibility for an attack days earlier against an “alcohol store” in the village of Sukhu in Khasavyurt District. The Khasavyurt Jamaat warned that those who refuse to quit such activity will receive punishment at the hands of the jamaat.14 The next day a battle ensued between Khasavyurt mujahedin and security forces in which four mujahedin

were killed, and three spetsnaz were injured. Among the mujahedin killed were Khasavyurt Jamaat amir Ruslam Makavov. On January 20th the Khasavyurt Sector mujahedin also warned owners of establishments selling alcohol. The next day Russia’s National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAK) reported killing Kizlyar amir Pakhrudin Gadzhiev in Novokakhonov, Kizlyar District during a special operation. The NAK reported that Gadzhiev had been behind the dual suicide bombing in Kizlyar in March 2010 and the murders of religious leaders and law enforcement personnel in Kizlyar including Cossack Ataman Pyotr Stetsenko and Deputy Chief of the Legal Information Center of Dagestan’s MVD Shevket Kudzhaev, among others.

On February 1st two IEDs were found and disarmed at the Irganaisk Hydroelectric Station. On the same day two alleged mujahedin from Makhachkala were killed. On February 9th the Khasavyurt mujahedin shot up the local MVD building killing two policem. Two days later a battle ensued when mujahedin attacked a group of law enforcement personnel near a railroad track in Kizlyar. That same day Dagestani authorities stopped all railroad traffic in the republic for security reasons. On the evening of February 17th the Kizlyar mujahedin bombed a food store in one attack and a group of police in a second bombing. The only casualty in these attacks was the wounding of

the store’s guard, but the mujahedin claimed the store was completely destroyed. On February 19th a policeman was wounded in Makhachkala. Also on February 19th two female fortune-tellers were killed in Makhachkala, and a food store in Novyi Suluk in Khasavyurt District was shot at wounding a woman. Police days later killed a mujahed it suspected had been involved in the murder of the fortune-tellers. On February 21st a major gun battle took place between mujahedin and security forces, killing and wounding several law enforcement personnel.

On February 16th Russian law enforcement and security organs began to counter the jihadi attacks with a counter-terrorist operation in Kizlyar and Tarumov Districts that lasted until the end of the month. The NAK reported that the operation yielded the capture of 16 members and facilitators of the Kizlyar Jamaat and the seizure of numerous weapons including two IEDs. One of the detained had recently been released from detention and is now suspected of participating in the 31 March 2010 dual suicide bombing in Kizlyar that killed 13 and wounded 30. Magomed Abakarov is the son of amir Shapi Mikatov killed in 1999 had just been released after serving a four-year term for participation in the jihadi underground.

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**JANUARY 2011: MOST VIOLENT JANUARY FOR CHRI/CE IN A DECADE**

Kavkaz uzel reported that in the month of January 84 non-civilians and civilians were killed and at least 164 were wounded in the North Caucasus. Of the 84 killed, 19 were declared mujahedin by the siloviki. Thus, the mujahedin killed 65 people in January 2011 (13 state agents and 52 civilians). According to Kavkaz uzel, among the wounded were 19 siloviki and 144 civilians (which does add up to the 164 wounded counted by Kavkaz uzel).Regardless, such numbers far exceed the number of casualties in the North Caucasus in any January since the end of the second conventional Russo-Chechen war in 2001, and the figures do not even include the 40 killed and 100 wounded in the January 24th Domodedovo Airport suicide bombing in Moscow. This suggests that 2011 will be a very difficult year. This year IIPER will be reporting figures for the number of attacks and casualties on a quarterly rather than a monthly basis.

IIPER’s figures for the number of attacks and violent incidents and casualties among state agents and civilians do not typically deviate substantially from those of Kavkaz uzel. We have been unable to find similar figures from Kavkaz uzel for previous Januaries. However, using IIPER’s figures for every January since the formation of the CE for which we have monthly totals, we find the following for comparison. In January 2009, the CE mujahedin killed 13 and wounded 24. In January 2010, they killed 9 and wounded 20. Januaries from 2002 to 2008 saw far fewer attacks than in January 2009 and 2010, so it is unlikely that figures for those earlier Januaries would exceed those of 2009 and 2010. Therefore, the number of casualties inflicted by the CE mujahedin in January 2011 exceeds those in January 2009 and January 2010 by a factor of six to seven, not counting the Domodedovo attack. If Domodedovo is included the difference rises to a factor of more than 10 times more killed and wounded in January 2011.

It should be recalled that the winter season is one of downtime and regeneration for the mujahedin due to the harsh weather and living conditions in the mountain forests where many of the mujahedin are forced to hole up.

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**IS THERE AN ASTRAKHAN JAMAAT?**

A January article posted on the Ingush GV’s website Hunafa.com mentions an “Astrakhan jamaat” together with a “Dagestani jamaat.” This suggests that there exists a Astrakhan jihadi cell tied to the CE. Reader will


recall that there were several jihadi-related incidents in Astrakhan last year and that early in the year CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov promised to liberate Astrakhan as well as Krasndar Krai and the Idel-Ural region (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and perhaps other Tatar- and Bashkir-populated regions in the Volga and Urals mega-regions.

THE CE’S DAGESTAN VILAIYAT ADDS THIRD WEBSITE

The CE’s Dagestan node, the Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV), added a new website to its arsenal in December - www.vdagestan.com.31 This adds to the DV’s communications and propaganda infrastructure that already included to its JamaatShariat.com (www.jamaatshariat.com/ru) and Guraba.net (http://guraba.net/), which has both Russian and Avar language pages.

UMAROV WEIGHS IN ON DEBATE OVER CE’S OFFICIAL LANGAUGE

In mid-January, CE amir Dokku ‘Abu Usman’ Umarov weighed in on the limited discussion that emerged on CE-affiliated websites in late 2010 on the issue of what language ought to be the official or state language of the Caucasus Emirate should it ever be established as a full-fledged state-emirate. Since there are no doubts about the CE’s victory, Umarov argued that “already today we should prepare for constructing our state.” He emphasized the language issue’s “importance” and called for a careful weighing of the pluses and minuses of the candidate languages, which appear to remain Arabic and Turkish. The pluses Umarov finds in Turkish include its legacy as the language of the Ottoman Caliphate and the basis of several of the languages of the peoples of the North Caucasus. Arabic’s pluses are its status as “the language of the sacred Koran and the native language of Islam.” He cautioned that the issue needed to be weighed extremely carefully, taking into account “all the nuances of today’s situation in the Caucasus itself as well as the situation in the world, which has entered a zone of global instability and changes.” Also, “not only cultural priorities but also historical prospects and political aspects in light of intensely changing political configuration in geographical regions important to us” should be taken into account. Umarov also called for the discussion to be broadened and for “proposals, remarks, and

arguments” to be “systematized and thoroughly analyzed.”

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**CE, AL QA’IDA, AND THE GLOBAL JIHAD IDEOLOGICAL-PROPAGANDA TIES**

This year has seen more CE articulations showing its place within the global jihadi revolutionary movement which is part and parcel of the broader revolutionary situation developing across much of the Arab and Muslims worlds. Last year ended with an article cheerleading for the Taliban against U.S. forces in Afghanistan in which Gen. David Petraeus and Pentagon data were cited. CE sites regularly carry reports from the Afghanistan and other jihadi fronts across the globe.

An excerpt in the form of the first part of chapter 5 from * Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner* written by Al Qa’ida’s (AQ) second-in-command Sheikh and Doctor Ayman az-Zawahiri, was translated into Russian and posted on the CE-affiliated website Umma News in January. A smaller excerpt appeared on the CE’s main site *Kavkaz tsentr*. The excerpts touch on Dagestan, Zawahiri’s arrest in Dagestan in 1996, and the ties between Zawahiri’s family and several North Caucasus immigrants in Egypt who had fought against Russia’s colonization of the region in the 19th century. Umma News promised more Russian-language excerpts from Zawahiri’s book would be forthcoming.

*Kavkaz tsentr* carried a summary of AQ leader Sheikh Osama bin Laden’s appeal to the French people on January 21st.

The OVKBK’s website *Islamdin.com* carried a letter written from a Jordanian prison by the global jihad’s leading philosopher Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi in January 2011. Maqdisi claims in the letter that he was asked by authorities to write a statement condemning the jihad, and when he refused they began to “terrorize” him, his “guests and brothers” and was

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then arrested for his “religion of Abraham and support for the Jihad and the mujahedin.” He assured his followers, among whom the CE mujahedin may be counted, that he was holding his own and would never betray his religion, “if that is Allah’s will.” The letter was also carried on Kavkaz tsentr and Al-Ansar.info (http://al-ansar.info/forum.php).  

CENTRAL ASIA

EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS REGISTER UNDER FALSE NAMES IN UZBEKISTAN?

Uzbekistan has begun investigations on religious organizations that might be using religion as a front for political and extremist motivations. These organizations, through false names, entice the youth to join. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has used names such as “Union of True Believers” and “Islamic Brotherhood” while Hizb ut-Tahrir Islami (HTI), has used “United Asia,” to spread their propagandist messages. According to Central Asia Online, there are more than 2,200 religious organizations in Uzbekistan but due to the recent events in Rasht, at Domodedovo, and in the Caucasus, the authorities are making sure all organizations are properly registered and are not involved in any extremism.  

THIRTEEN PEOPLE SENTENCED FOR ISLAMIST MEMBERSHIP IN UZBEKISTAN

The Uzbek regional court sentenced 13 men to serve between 6 and 10 years in prison due to their alleged membership as part of an Islamist group. The charges included “encroachment on the constitutional order and dissemination of materials harmful to public safety and order,” according to eurasialift.wordpress.com. The men included an Imam, several farmers, and

38 Ibid.
soccer commentator Khayrulla Hamidov.39

SECURITY IMPROVEMENT IN UZBEKISTAN
Following the Domodedova Airport attack in Moscow, security measures have been stepped up across Uzbekistan’s capitol, Tashkent, and specifically in the Tashkent railway station. Increased security measures include installation of gates, implementation of identification document regulations that prohibit those without tickets from entering the information desk area, and disallowing lighters from being carried onboard flights. According to fergananews.com, non-passengers at airports not only cannot enter the departure hall but also cannot enter the periphery of the building.40

KYRGYZSTAN PRESIDENT ROZA OTUNBAYEVA CALLS FOR A U.S. FUNDED ANTI TERROR TRAINING CENTER
While receiving a “Woman of Courage Award” from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva called for establishing a US-funded anti-terrorism base in Batken. Previous plans to build the center were crushed during the revolution last year, but President Otunbayeva is intent on strengthening the security of the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, regardless of any risk of angering Russia over continued U.S. presence. Otunbayeva’s resolution stems from increased terrorism and the emergence of the home-grown organization, Jamat Kyrgyzstan Jaish al-Mahdi, the same organization that plotted to attack the US airbase and embassy.41 According to centralasianewswire.com, the plan for the previous base cost “$5.5 million and would have been used to train Kyrgyz security forces in counter-terrorist techniques.”42

Terrorism is expected to increase in spring and summer, especially in the south. Kyrgyzstan is cooperating with their neighbors on security matters so that groups such as the IMU and HTI are blocked entering the Ferghana Valley.\textsuperscript{43}

\section*{SECURITY EFFORTS IN TAJIKISTAN}
Not only is Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon seeking Pakistani anti-terror aid, but Tajiks are being trained in an official FBI capacity to handle hostage taking situations. During the President’s visit to Pakistan, he discussed security issues with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari. According to \textit{Central Asia Online}, militants linked to the IMU have fled to Pakistan and contacted Al-Qaeda there.\textsuperscript{44}

On March 8\textsuperscript{th}, Tajikistani government employees underwent security training at the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe. The course was taught by two American agents for a week, to improve law enforcement, crisis management, and the efficiency of government bureaucracies. \textit{Centralasianewswire.com} reported that the United States has contributed $900 million dollars to improving democratic institutions in Tajikistan.\textsuperscript{45}

\section*{TERRORIST ATTACK ON MARCH 8\textsuperscript{TH} IN DUSHANBE}
Tajik law enforcement characterized the blast that occurred on March 8\textsuperscript{th}, International Women’s Day, as an act of terrorism. The blast occurred outside Lesnaya Skazka Restaurant early Tuesday morning wounding a teenager, and shattering the windows of an apartment building close by. According to \textit{Asia-Plus}, the blast was from a homemade shell-less explosive device, equivalent to 50 grams of TNT.\textsuperscript{46}

ELEVEN ISLAMISTS CONVICTED IN TAJIKISTAN

Eleven alleged members of HTI have been sentences to different terms in prison for ethnical, racial, and religious incitement as well as violent attempts to overturn the constitutional order by a Sughd province court. According to Asia-Plus, “Khujand resident Husein Vorisjonov, 33, and Bobojonghafurov resident Abdulkhiliq Mulloyev, 42, were sentenced to 20 years each. Khujand resident Habibulo Jourayev, 34, was sentenced to 18 years in prison and Jabborrasulov resident Hoshim Abdulloyev, 40, got a jail term of 15 years. Bobojonghafurov residents Tohir Mahmoudjonov, 28, and Muqim Bobojonov, 28, were sentenced to 9 years each. Istaravshan residents Shavkat Muhammadiyev, 37, and Dilshod Mukhtorov, 33, were sentenced to 13 and 10 years in prison, respectively. Mastchoh resident Nabi Davlatov, 43, was sentenced to 13 years in prison, Khujand resident Yusufjon Yusufjonov, 32, was sentenced to 14 years in prison and Bobojonghafurov resident Nozim Ergashev, 41, got a jail term of 4 years.”47

CSTO COMPILING A LIST OF TERRORIST AND EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is creating an organization registry of terrorist and extremist groups that pose a security threat in the region, especially along the Afghan border. Apparently, extremist groups have intensified their activities in Central Asia by expanding their activities and infiltrating the Taliban into the former Soviet republics.48

ABOUT IIPER

Islam, Islamism and politics in Eurasia report (IIPER) is a project of the Monterey Terrorism and Research and Education Program (MonTREP) at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, California. It focuses on all politically-relevant issues involving or bearing on Islam and ethnic Muslim communities in Russia and Eurasia writ large. All issues of IIPER can be found at http://www.miis.edu/academics/faculty/ghahn/report.

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IIPER welcomes submissions of 1,500-6,000 words on any aspect of Islamic politics in Eurasia and financial contributions to support the project. For related inquiries or to request to be included on IIPER’s mailing list, please contact gordon.hahn@miis.edu or gordon-hahn@sbcglobal.net.

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