Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia
Report
No. 33, 26 January 2011

Edited and Written by Gordon M. Hahn (unless otherwise indicated)

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TRENDS IN JIHADIST IN RUSSIA DURING 2010 IN STATISTICS

INTRODUCTION

The year 2010 has been a year in which there has been general strengthening of jihadism. For the third consecutive full year the Caucasus Emirate produced an increase in terrorist activity over the year before, consolidating its integration into the global jihadi revolutionary movement. Another trend consolidated in 2010 was the relative marginalization of the Chechen operations within the overall Caucasus jihad on the background of an expanded geography of CE operations across Russia.
In 2010 there were approximately 583 jihadi-related attacks and violent incidents in Russia (see Table below). All but five of those attacks/incidents (1 in Tatarstan and 4 in Bashkortostan) were carried out by mujahedin from the North Caucasus, and almost all of them are attributed to the Caucasus Emirate (CE). Very few of these 578 attacks/incidents attributed to the CE might have been carried out by breakaway mujahedin of the now independent Nokchicho Vilaiyat (INV) mujahedin who split with the CE-loyal Nokchicho Vilaiyat mujahedin in August-September 2010. **Both figures of 583 and 578 represent a 14% increase over last year’s 511 jihadi attacks/incidents.** In 2008, there 372 attacks/incidents; in 2007 approximately 300. **Thus, for the third consecutive year, the CE has increased the number of attacks from the previous year.** (For my statistics for 2008 and 2009, see IIPER, Nos. 7 and 8 in IIPER’s archive at www.miis.edu/academics/faculty/ghahn/report). Of the approximate 583 jihadi-related violent incidents/attacks last year, 105 were counter-terrorist operations or actions undertaken by federal and/or local forces against the mujahedin. I also counted 95 prevented attacks not counting some 5 interdicted suicide bombings.

The 583 attacks/incidents led to approximately 821 casualties among state agents (civilian officials and military, police and intelligence personnel), including 288 killed and 533 wounded. This was the lowest number of state agents killed in the first three full years (January 1st – to December 31st) since the CE’s founding and the second consecutive year of decline in that figure; there were 412 killed in 2008 and 376 in 2009. There were 608 casualties among civilians, including 112 killed and 496 wounded. In Bashkortostan no state agents were killed or wounded but two civilians were killed and five wounded in clashes between mujahedin and security forces in March and August. In the Tatarstan clash between alleged mujahedin and security forces there were no casualties but the three mujahedin killed. **The total number of jihad-related non-mujahedin casualties among state agents and civilians in 2010 was therefore 1,429, which represents a 12.4% increase** over the 1,271 casualties caused by the mujahedin in 2009.

**The CE caused fewer casualties among state agents but many more among civilians in 2010 as compared with 2009 or any full year since the CE’s formation in October 2007.** The mujahedin’s attacks against state agents were less effective in 2010 than in 2009; the 14% increase in the number of CE attacks resulted in a 23% decline in state agents killed and a 17% decline in those wounded. The 821 state agent casualties was even fewer than the 850 casualties inflicted in just 373 CE attacks/related incidents in 2008. On the other hand, CE attacks killed 120% more civilians and wounded 149% more civilians in 2010 than in 2009. **The 608 civilian casualties of 2010 exceeded the number (101) of those inflicted in 2008 by a factor of six.**
Looking at the individual regions, **Dagestan became the jihad's center of gravity in spring 2010 and finished the year with this unfortunate status intact, seeing almost half of the jihadi attacks and related violent incidents carried out in all of Russia.** Under the CE mujahedin’s organizational structure, the republic’s Dagestan Vilaiyat (DV) is one of the four main structures along with the Gal’gaiche Vilaiyat (responsible for CE ops in Ingushetia and North Ossetia), the United Vilaiyat of Kabardia, Balkaria and Karachai or OVKVK [responsible for operations in Kabardino-

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<th>No. of Terrorist Incidents</th>
<th>Servicemen and Civilian Officials Killed</th>
<th>Service-men and Civilian Officials Wounded</th>
<th>Civilians Killed</th>
<th>Civilians Wounded</th>
<th>Jihadists Killed</th>
<th>Jihadists Wounded</th>
<th>Jihadists Captured and Surrendered</th>
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<td>-1%</td>
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*The data that forms the base for this table’s figures were researched by Gordon M. Hahn as well as Leonid Naboishchikov, Daniel Painter, Seth Gray, and Darya Ushakova.

**Methodology:** The data in this table are estimates. The estimates for the figures in the table’s various categories represent the average of the minimum jihadi-reported figures and of the average of the minimum and maximum figures from non-jihadi sources. The logic behind this methodology is based on the tendency of Russian and local government and non-jihadi Russian and local media (often tied to or dependent on government reporting) to underreport the number of terrorist incidents and their resulting casualties as well as the tendency of jihadist sources to exaggerate the jihadists’ capacity by sometimes claiming responsibility for attacks carried out by others for criminal, ethnic, or clan purposes and exaggerating the numbers of casualties caused by their own attacks. Incidents include not only attacks carried out, but also successful and attempted arrests. They do not include prevented attacks (deactivated bombs, etc.).

**SOURCES:** The Caucasus Emirate’s websites, especially Kavkaz tseitr (www.kavkazcenter.com), Hunafa.com (http://hunafa.com), Jamaat Shariat (www.jamaatshariat.com/ru), Islamdin.com (www.islamdin.com), as well as such non-jihadi sources as Russian media outlets like Kavkazskii uzel (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru).
Balkaria (KBR) and Karachai-Cherkessia (KChR)], and the Nokchicho or Chechen Vilaiyat (NV) which split into two groups in late summer 2010, the CE-loyal NV and the breakaway or independent NV (INV). **Of the four main CE vilaiyats (province in Arabic), the DV’s mujahedin carried out approximately 267 attacks, 45.8% of the total number of attacks/incidents (583) in Russia in 2010 and 46.2% of those attributable to the CE (578).** Compared to last year, the DV more than doubled the number of overall casualties it inflicted, 482 compared to 221, a 118.6% increase. The DV’s violence in 2010 exceeded that in 2008 by 277% (482 attacks/incidents versus 128). From 2009 to 2010 the DV increased the number of state agents it killed by 189%, the number of state agents wounded by 64%, the number of civilians killed by 164%, and the number of civilians wounded by 560%. The last two increases do not include the two Dagestani female suicide bombers (the wives of killed DV amirs) who attacked the Moscow subway system in March 2010, killing 40 and wounding 101.

The KBR saw the second highest level of jihadi violence among Russia’s regions, with 113 attacks/incidents in 2010. Ingushetia followed with 99 and Chechnya brought up the rear with 80. The rise of jihadi violence last year in the KBR was most impressive. **The OVKBK’s 113 attacks in the KBR represent a 391% increase over 2009 (23 attacks/incidents) and a 304% increase over 2008 (28 attacks/incidents).** In 2010 as compared with 2009, the OVKBK increased casualties it inflicted in the KBR by 450%, from 24 to 132. Civilians killed rose 800% and those wounded rose 1,133% in the KBR. The KChR, which also comes under the OVKBK’s purview, saw 4 attacks/incidents in 2010, the first in several years. **The OVKBK was responsible, therefore, for 20.2% (117 of 578) of all those attributed to the CE in 2010.** This occurred despite the death of the OVKBK’s amir and veritable founder and CE qadi ‘Seifullah’ Anzor Astemirov. However, it was like his work before being killed by Russian forces that laid the ground work for this surge in OVKBK terrorism.
The Ingush GV and Chechen NV (and INV) were responsible for 17.1% and 13.8% of CE attacks/related incidents in 2010, respectively. Ingushetia saw 164 casualties in some 90 attacks. The number of attacks in Ingushetia declined by 43%, and the number of casualties declined by 70% (from 615 to 183) compared with 2009. This is likely a consequence of the Russian forces’ successes in killing the leading CE operative, the Ingushetia-based Sheikh Said Abu Saad Buryatskii, and the capture of the GV’s amir and the CE’s military amir ‘Magas’ Ali Taziev (aka Akhmed Yevloev). However, the three attacks in North Ossetia last year should be attributed to the Ingush GV mujahedin, who are responsible for CE ops in that largely Christian republic. Those three North Ossetia attacks included two suicide bombings in which there were 171 casualties, 17 killed and 154 wounded. This boosts the GV’s share of casualties inflicted by the CE to 25% (354 of 1,408).

Chechnya’s mujahedin ended the year as they began it as the laggards among the four main CE vilaiyats. The NV and INV were involved out 80 attacks/incidents in 2010, just 13.8% of the CE total and less than one-third of the number carried out by the Dagestani mujahedin. The number of attacks in Chechnya declined by 50% from 2009 to 2010, after a surge of 24% in 2009 compared to 2008. The NV/INV political struggle and split in August-September surely contributed to this decline. The ratio of incidents (usually counter-terrorist operations) to attacks is typically much higher in Chechnya than in the other republics, given Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov’s more aggressive and brutal counter-insurgency strategy. This suggests that the initiative and robustness of the NV/INV may be even lower than that represented by these figures. On the other hand, it should be noted that the Chechen mujahedin often cross over into Ingushetia, and therefore some of the attacks and casualties in Ingushetia could be attributable to the NV or INV.

MUJAHEDIN CASUALTIES

My count of mujahedin casualties and losses relies on non-jihadi Russian sources as well as notoriously low jihadi reporting on their own casualties. Therefore, they are less reliable than non-jihadi Russian sources. Nevertheless, my figures show that at least 372 mujahedin were removed from the jihadi battlefield in 2010 with 261 killed and 101 captured or surrendered. According to Kavkaz uzel, there no less than 349 mujahedin (“members of underground bands”) killed in the North Caucasus during 2010.1 Neither figure includes the hundreds of facilitators (suppliers, financiers, and intelligence gatherers) killed and captured.

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SUICIDE TERRORIST ATTACKS

2010 saw 14 suicide bombing attacks carried out by the CE and its Riyudus Salikhin martyrs’ Brigade, if one counts the coordinated Moscow subway attack by two suicide bombers as two separate attacks. There were 16 such attacks in 2009. There were no suicide attacks in November and December. The final suicide terrorist attack of 2010 occurred on October 23rd, when a lone suicide car bomber in Khasavyurt, Dagestan on a police dormitory for police personnel being rotated from other regions in and out of the North Caucasus. Figures varied, but it appears 1-2 state agents were killed and 7-20 people were wounded. It remained unclear how many were civilians and how many were not.2

These 14 suicide attacks used 24-25 suicide bombers (reportedly 7 suicide bombers targeted Kadyrov’s residence in Tsentoroi in September), killed 34-48 state agents, wounded 112-159 state agents, killed 66 civilians, and wounded 298 civilians. The geography of these 14 suicide attacks was as follows: six in Dagestan, two in Ingushetia, two in North Ossetia (claimed by the Ingush GV mujahedin), two in Chechnya, and two in Moscow (the March 29th dual suicide bombing of the Moscow subway system carried out by the DV, specifically the wives of the DV’s amir Magomedali Vagabov, aka Al-Bara, and a lower-ranking amir, respectively). In 2009 the geography of suicide bombing attacks was strikingly different with 11 in Chechnya, 4 in Ingushetia, and only 1 in Dagestan.

There were several interdicted attacks during 2010, including three in May. A fifteenth suicide attack in 2010 may have been averted on New Year’s Eve when a female from the Caucasus accidentally detonated a bomb she appears to have been preparing for a terrorist attack. This incident appears to have been related to the first successful suicide bombing of 2011 (see below).

In summing up the CE’s year operationally speaking, it seems fair to say that it remained surprisingly capacious, strengthened its positions outside Chechnya, especially in Dagestan, and declined significantly in Chechnya. Its territorial reach was slightly more extensive, and its operations were somewhat less efficient and more focused against civilians.

THE CAUCASUS EMIRATE: THE FIRST THREE YEARS

Looking briefly at the results for the first three years of the CE founded at the end of October in 2007, we see the following results in terms of estimated jihadi terrorism statistics:

- 1,500 attacks/incidents (1,458 from 1 January 2008 through 31 December 2010 plus approximately 50 in November-December 2007)
- 3,750 casualties (1,300 killed and 2,450 wounded)
- 1,100 state agents killed (1,067 from 1 January 2008 through 31 December 2010 plus approximately 33 in November-December 2007)
- 1,650 state agents wounded (1,606 from 1 January 2008 through 31 December 2010 plus approximately 46 in November-December 2007)
- 200 civilians killed (199 from 1 January 2008 through 31 December 2010)
- 800 civilians wounded (750 from 1 January 2008 through 31 December 2010 plus approximately 50 in November-December 2007)
- approximately 1,000 mujahedin killed
- approximately 500 mujahedin captured
- approximately 2,500 facilitators of the mujahedin killed and captured

A balanced assessment would conclude that the CE has become one of the main fronts in the global jihadi revolutionary movement alongside, if slightly less threatening to Western interests than AfPak, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula and Palestine’s Hamas and Hezbollah. The CE jihad has, however, outpaced those in North Africa and Southeast Asia.

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DOMODEDOVO AIRPORT SUICIDE BOMBING
On December 31st, a woman of Caucasus nationality apparently accidentally detonated a bomb in a single home structure on the property of the “Obyekt” Club on Golovacheva Street in southeast Moscow. The 80 square meter house was completely destroyed. Her body and that of a companion were badly mutilated and severed by the explosion, and her husband was reported to member of the Caucasus mujahedin fighter under arrest in Pyatigorsk, Stavropol in the North Caucasus. On January 6th another woman reportedly of Chechen nationality was arrested in Volgograd just outside the North Caucasus. The 24-year old woman was brought to Moscow for interrogation and was suspected of organizing a terrorist attack in the Russian capitol.3

Thus, on January 24th when one or several suicide bombers detonated their bombs near the international section of Moscow’s Domodedova Airport killing 35 and wounding as many as 180, law enforcement was probably or should have been engaged in frantic hunt for possible terrorists in Moscow. Much has been said about the inexcusably lax security at the airport, and the potential for a terrorist attack should have been communicated to the managers of transport infrastructure across the city. We do not know whether this was done or not. However, any Americans’ experience with U.S. airports should make it abundantly clear that it would be very easy to carry out a similar attack in any U.S. airport, where there are no obstacles to entering the main terminals with several heavy luggage bags and approaching crowded registration and ticketing areas.

The two most likely scenarios in descending order of their likelihood are the Caucasus Emirate mujahedin's Dagestani branch, the Dagestani Vilaiyat, or the one of the CE's Chechen branches. The Dagestanis carried out nearly half of the jihadi attacks in 2010 (approximately 267 out of approximately 574) and the Moscow subway suicide bombings last March. As IIIPER has noted numerous times, the shakhidkas who perpetrated the Moscow subway attack were the wives of the DV’s top amir and a lower-ranking amir, respectively. Regarding the Chechen branch’s possible involvement, this would mean that either the CE's loyal Nokchicho (Chechnya) Vilaiyat (NV) or the breakaway independent Nokchicho Vilaiyat (INV) led by Hussein Gakaev carried out the attack. The CE’s NV split in August-September 2010, and the INV claims to have formed its own separate structures. The INV could use such an attack to raise its profile which has been largely non-existent since the NV split. The CE-loyal NV could also use such an attack given the relative paucity of operations in 2010 compared with the CE’s other vilaiyats.

The CE’s alliance with the global jihadi revolutionary movement and Al Qa’ida may have reflected in the fact that the explosion occurred in the airport’s international arrivals section. According to Reuters, a list of victims put out by Russia’s Emergencies Ministry includes eight foreigners: two British citizen and one German, Bulgarian, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Ukrainian citizen each. Ukrainian Anna Yablonskaya, 29, a playwright, was headed to Moscow to receive an award. Great Britain’s Foreign Office confirms one Briton was killed in the attack.4

In April 2009 Umarov announced the revival of the Riyadus Salikhin Martyrs Brigade and promised attacks inside Russia, and since then a suicide bombing campaign has proceeded with 16 in 2009, 14 in 2010, and now one this year.

It cannot be excluded that Russian neo-fascists or a more obscure group could be behind the attack given the availability of bomb-building instructions on the Internet, not least of all on CE websites, but this is unlikely. Only Islamists have shown the capacity and willingness to engage in attacks of random terrorism such as this one. IIIPER will update information on this attack in the next issue.

AZERBAIJAN

AZERBAIJAN’S BAN ON HIJAB

In early December Azerbaijan’s government approved a ban forbidding schoolgirls and teachers from wearing the hijab to lessons. This sparked protests by hundreds, perhaps thousands of parents and children at the Education Ministry building. The Azerbaijani mujahedin’s website AzeriJihadMedia reported, citing mainstream Azeraijani media, that several schools began forbidding the hijab immediately after Education Minister Misir Mardanov’s announcement of the ban.5 Jihadi groups in the Caucasus are sure to attempt to use this move by the Azerbaijani government in order to promote recruitment across the region, especially in Azerbaijan. Several pro-jihad Azeri websites, such as AzeriJihadMedia.com and Milleti-Ibrahim.com (www.milleti-ibrahim.com/az/) openly promote the Caucasus Emirate and the works of radical Islamist preachers and ideologists like Abu Muhammad Asim Al-Maqdisi. Several Azeris have been found among killed CE mujahedin, and the CE’s Dagestan Vilaiyat has an Azerbaijani Jamaat. CE websites promote jihadism in Azerbaijan as well. Dagestan borders Azerbaijan, and ethnic Lezgins especially, but also other ethnic groups straddle the border.

CENTRAL ASIA

KYRGYZSTAN

RASHOD KAMOLOV, UZBEK IMAM ARRESTED IN KYRGYZSTAN

Rashod Kamolov, an ethnically Uzbek Imam, was arrested for fraud on Tuesday, January 18, 2011 by the Kyrgyz police at Manas airport. Allegedly, extremist material was found at his residence, 24.kg news agency reported. Kamolov is the chief imam in Kara-Suu district of the southern Osh region which borders Uzbekistan. According to Central Asia Newswire, two Uzbek citizens claimed that Kamolov cheated them out of $6,300 that they provided him to set up their hajj trip to Saudi Arabia.6

After a court ruling from the Sverdlov district, Kamolov will be held in

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pretrial detention. Fears of mass protests after his arrest were raised as many Uzbekis have taken to the streets after previous arrests of Kamolov, but none were evident, even after his absence from Friday prayers. Apparently, his father, Rafik Kamolov, was a prominent cleric, who was killed by a Kyrgyz security forces operative team during an operation to root out Islamic militants four years ago.

COLLECTION OF WEAPONRY FOUND IN OSH PROVINCE, KYRGYZSTAN

In the Kara-Suu region of the Osh province, a black shop was found on January 23rd, containing criminal material. Two locals, now detained, were transforming air guns into gunshot weapons. An AK-47, 23 5.45mm ammunition chips, 20 7.62mm bullets and a home-made sabre were confiscated, according to Dzhalal-Abad Internal Affairs Lt. Col. M. Mergentayev. According to 24.kg news agency, three other locals arrested last weekend for their alleged ties to Hizb ut-Tahrir are possibly connected with the black shop.

KYRGYZ INTERIOR LISTS 1,279 PEOPLE AS TERRORISTS

In a speech delivered before the Kyrgyz parliament’s committee for defense and security issues on January 18th, Kyrgyz Interior Minister, Zarylbek Rysaliev, announced that there were 1,279 registered terrorists. Each extremist’s profile outlines his group affiliation and background. According to Rysaliev, “1,192 support Hizb ut-Tahrir, 49 are Wahhabis, 32 are members of the Akramiya movement, and two belong to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.”

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in much of Central Asia.

**ISLAMIC JIHAD UNION MILITANTS KILLED IN KYRGYZSTAN**

Two suspected terrorists of the Islamic Jihad Union were killed and one captured after gunfire broke out in Bishkek on January 13th. According to Marat Imankulov, the first deputy chairman of the State National Security Committee, and *Fergana news*, the extremists were radicals aiming to create a caliphate in Ferghana valley. They allegedly were trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

**TAJIKISTAN**

**TAJIK COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS**

Islamic militants have been blamed for the Sunday, January 23rd, assault on the Tajik military convoy killing at least 23 people. Machine guns and grenade launchers were used in the attack. According to Faridun Makhmadaliev, a spokesman for the Tajik Defense Ministry, the extremists have been using Islam to incite a civil war, and the attack was led by former field commanders from the United Tajik Opposition. Although the Islamic militants have been behind previous attacks on military convoys in the Rasht Valley, critics are accusing Tajikistan’s president, Emomali Rakhmon, of artificially promoting the threat of religious extremism in order to fight political dissidents opposed to his regime.

Apparently, the military convoy was searching for those who managed to escape from the Dushanbe detention center in summer. Although the police tracked down Ibrokhim Nasriddinov, the organizer, several weeks ago, the attacks could be linked, *New York Times* reported. According to *Radio Free Europe*, the Tajik military continues to search for Muhammadkarim Ibrohimov, known as Kamol, who joined the group headed by Ali Bedaki.

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Furthermore, Abdullo Rahimov, known as Mullo Abdullo, is suspected to be still hiding out and organizing in the Rasht Valley area.

**HIZB UT-TAHRIR LEADERS JAILED**

Yusuf Khafizov, leader of the Hizb ut-Tahrir movement, has been sentenced to 18 years in prison by the Dushanbe City Court Judge, Muhabbat Shamsiddinova on January 21st. His sentence includes no political activity for four years after he serves in prison. Seven other members will be serving terms from six to seventeen years. According to *Radio Free Europe*, the extremists have been found guilty of inciting ethnic and religious hatred and attempting to overthrow the government and built an Islamic state. 15 The defendants claim that they intended to use only political means to achieve their goal of establishing an Islamic state.

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ABOUT IIPER

Islam, Islamism and politics in Eurasia report (IIPER) is a project of the Monterey Terrorism and Research and Education Program (MonTREP) at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, California. It focuses on all politically-relevant issues involving or bearing on Islam and ethnic Muslim communities in Russia and Eurasia writ large. All issues of IIPER can be found at http://www.miis.edu/academics/faculty/ghahn/report.

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IIPER welcomes submissions of 1,500-6,000 words on any aspect of Islamic politics in Eurasia and financial contributions to support the project. For related inquiries or to request to be included on IIPER’s mailing list, please contact gordon.hahn@miis.edu or gordon-hahn@sbcglobal.net.

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